Key information

Title
SOUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR CRITICAL OFFSHORE INFRASTRUCTURE
Application number
20230971
Case type
National
Status
27.05.2024 Innsigelse innkommet og under behandling
Filed
12.09.2023
Effective date
12.09.2023
Publicly available
27.05.2024
Next annual fee due
30.09.2027
Applicant
MODI VIVENDI AS (NO)
Owner
MODI VIVENDI AS (NO)
Inventor
Gunnar Myhr (NO)
Granted
27.05.2024
Patent number
347950
Expiry date
12.09.2043

Abstract and drawing

Disclaimer: This text has been machine-scanned and may contain errors – please refer to "Publications" for legally binding content.
This invention relates to passive underwater surveillance, and detection systems and applications, operated on and controlled through, with communications to or from a central processing unit, via civic or commercial offshore power cables to at least one underwater sensor.

Publications

Latest published versionB1A1

Documents

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Date
 Date Doc. No. Process Case number In/Out Journal description To/from
 02.08.2026 17-01 Saksbehandling 20230971(347950) UT PT Varsel om betaling av årsavgift for år 4 + (3352) (PT20230971) MODI VIVENDI AS
 02.08.2025 16-01 Saksbehandling 20230971(347950) UT PT Varsel om betaling av første årsavgift (3317) (PT20230971) MODI VIVENDI AS
 28.07.2025 15-02 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT IAIN07P- Avgjørelse - innsigelse_2029396
28.07.2025 15-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Brev om avgjørelse, med klagefrist ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 28.07.2025 14-02 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT IAIN07P- Avgjørelse - innsigelse_2029396
28.07.2025 14-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Brev om avgjørelse, med klagefrist MODI VIVENDI AS
 10.07.2025 13-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Generelt brev MODI VIVENDI AS
 10.07.2025 12-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Generelt brev ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
11.04.2025 11-04 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Redaksjonell omtale - Finansavisen - Januar 30_2025 MODI VIVENDI AS
11.04.2025 11-03 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN NO347950 - RESPONSE TO ONSAGERS OPPOSITION AS OF FEBRUARY 26_ 2025 MODI VIVENDI AS
11.04.2025 11-02 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Kronikk - Equinor - Norges svar paa Roy Cohn - FA 30_01_2025 MODI VIVENDI AS
11.04.2025 11-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) MODI VIVENDI AS
 10.04.2025 10-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Opp til avgjørelse (tilstrekkelig opplyst) MODI VIVENDI AS
 10.04.2025 09-09 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn)
10.04.2025 09-08 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn)
10.04.2025 09-07 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn)
10.04.2025 09-06 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn)
10.04.2025 09-05 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn)
10.04.2025 09-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Opp til avgjørelse (tilstrekkelig opplyst) ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 24.03.2025 08-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 24.03.2025 06-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn)
20.03.2025 07-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 19.03.2025 05-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
17.03.2025 04-04 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Redaksjonell omtale - Finansavisen - Januar 30_2025
17.03.2025 04-03 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN NO347950 - RESPONSE TO ONSAGERS OPPOSITION AS OF FEBRUARY 26_ 2025
17.03.2025 04-02 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Kronikk - Equinor - Norges svar paa Roy Cohn - FA 30_01_2025
17.03.2025 04-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn)
27.02.2025 03-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Bekreftelse ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 27.02.2025 02-11 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Innsigelse mot NO347950 (OP1262NO00) 1218292
27.02.2025 02-10 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT D7 - WO2013019119 1218288
27.02.2025 02-09 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT D6 - Subsea docking station opens path for resident underwater drones (2019) 1218287
27.02.2025 02-08 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT D5 - WO2012156425 1218286
27.02.2025 02-07 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT D4 - WO2017164811 1218285
27.02.2025 02-06 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT D3 - KR20220051529 MT 1218284
27.02.2025 02-05 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT D3 - KR2022051529(A) 1218283
27.02.2025 02-04 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT D2 - Valve Choke monitoring Dual use of subsea acoustic leak detector 1218282
27.02.2025 02-03 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT D1 - WO2009067015 1218281
27.02.2025 02-02 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT CGK Viper Innovations - Subsea Equipment List 1218280
27.02.2025 02-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 UT Oversendelse av innsigelse IN01P MODI VIVENDI AS
 26.02.2025 01-12 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Innsigelse mot NO347950 (OP1262NO00) 1218292 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 26.02.2025 01-11 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Equinor Energy AS 1038407 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 26.02.2025 01-10 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN D7 - WO2013019119 1218288 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
26.02.2025 01-09 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN D6 - Subsea docking station opens path for resident underwater drones (2019) 1218287 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 26.02.2025 01-08 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN D5 - WO2012156425 1218286 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 26.02.2025 01-07 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN D4 - WO2017164811 1218285 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 26.02.2025 01-06 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN D3 - KR20220051529 MT 1218284 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 26.02.2025 01-05 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN D3 - KR2022051529(A) 1218283 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
26.02.2025 01-04 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN D2 - Valve Choke monitoring Dual use of subsea acoustic leak detector 1218282 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 26.02.2025 01-03 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN D1 - WO2009067015 1218281 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
26.02.2025 01-02 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN CGK Viper Innovations - Subsea Equipment List 1218280 ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 26.02.2025 01-01 Innsigelse 2025/00077 INN Nytt overprøvningskrav (OP) ACAPO ONSAGERS AS
 29.05.2024 15-01 Saksbehandling 20230971(347950) UT PT Registreringsbrev nasjonal patent (15) (PT20230971)
02.05.2024 14-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 UT Intention to grant MODI VIVENDI AS
 29.04.2024 13-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Abstract MODI VIVENDI AS
 26.04.2024 12-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 08.03.2024 11-04 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN NO20230971 Clean Body as of 080324 Gunnar Myhr
 08.03.2024 11-03 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN NO20230971 Body with Annotations March 8_2024 - pdf Gunnar Myhr
 08.03.2024 11-02 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN NO20230971 - krav på norsk 08_03_24 - pdf Gunnar Myhr
 08.03.2024 11-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 25.02.2024 10-03 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Revised Claims as of 25_02_24 with Annotations - NO20230971 - pdf Gunnar Myhr
 25.02.2024 10-02 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Claims as of 25_02_24 - NO20230971 - Clean Gunnar Myhr
 25.02.2024 10-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 14.02.2024 09-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 UT Substantive examination MODI VIVENDI AS
 31.01.2024 07-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 30.01.2024 06-03 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Revised Claims with Annotations - NO20230971 - pdf MODI VIVENDI AS
 30.01.2024 06-02 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Revised Claims - NO20230971 - Clean MODI VIVENDI AS
 30.01.2024 06-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) MODI VIVENDI AS
 25.01.2024 08-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 21.12.2023 05-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 UT Substantive examination MODI VIVENDI AS
 03.11.2023 04-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 30.10.2023 03-02 Saksbehandling 20230971 UT PT report 01:22:00
30.10.2023 03-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 UT Substantive examination MODI VIVENDI AS
 15.09.2023 02-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Korrespondanse (Hovedbrev inn) Gunnar Myhr
 12.09.2023 01-06 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Retten til oppfinnelse Gunnar Myhr
 12.09.2023 01-05 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN DRAWINGS Gunnar Myhr
 12.09.2023 01-04 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN DESCRIPTION Gunnar Myhr
 12.09.2023 01-03 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN CLAIMS Gunnar Myhr
 12.09.2023 01-02 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN ABSTRACT Gunnar Myhr
 12.09.2023 01-01 Saksbehandling 20230971 INN Søknadsskjema Patent Gunnar Myhr

Description, claims and drawings

Disclaimer: This text has been machine-scanned and may contain errors – please refer to "Publications" for legally binding content. Description
This invention relates to systems and applications for the protection of offshore power cables and hydrocarbon carrying pipelines against submarine activities.IntroductionTraditional military Underwater Sound Surveillance Systems (SOSUS), developed during the Cold War, have probably less technical capabilities than what is desirable. Also, the location of such systems does not consider the development and deployment of critical infrastructure, like e. g. AC/DC power lines between countries (e. g. between Norway and Germany), cables supplying offshore installations with electric power from onshore grids, AC/DC power lines from offshore wind farms, offshore hydrocarbon carrying pipelines or the safeguard of perimeters around oil and gas installations. Innovative systems and applications for the detection of underwater activities have been developed, emphasizing the detection and analysis of Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) targets. Novel methods and applications as means of power source and the use of (civic or commercial) offshore power lines as communications highways, have been developed. Government entities can coordinate several such systems into new strategic innovative SOSUS systems.Background – Critical and Vulnerable Offshore Power Grids and Infrastructures NordLink is Europe's longest direct power link between the Norwegian and German electricity markets, covering a total of 623 kilometers. NordLink is a 1400 MW HVDC (highvoltage direct current) cable. The North Sea Link is a 1400 MW HVDC interconnector stretching from Blyth in the UK, across the North Sea, to Kvilldal in Norway. Johan Sverdrup phase 1 is a 80 kV extruded DC cable system with a capacity of 100 MW to transmit power from the Norwegian power grid to the Johan Sverdrup offshore production facilities. In 2022, with phase 2, another 200 MW of DC power capacity was added to the Johan Sverdrup field, amounting to a total power from shore capacity to the field of 300 MW. Offshore wind power grids with shore connections have been established in the North Sea, and several more are planned.Published by the Broadcaster NRK, the program “Skyggekrigen” (“Shadow War”), part two, “Russia’s Spy ships”, it was documented that Russia was mapping critical offshore infrastructure in the form of e. g. communication links, land cables connecting offshore wind farms, and land-based grid connections to offshore oil and gas installations. On 26 September 2022, a series of underwater explosions damaged and caused underwater gas leakage on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines. Both pipelines were built to transport natural gas from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea. See e. g. use of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Nord_Stream_pipeline_sabotage.To provide warnings against interference, possible sabotage and destructions of these critical infrastructures, by divers, diver less intervention, use of atmospheric diving suits (ADS) like WASP or JIM, manned and unmanned underwater devices and submarines, novel and innovative detection systems and applications have been developed.Due to possible obsolete features and locations related to existing Underwater Sound Surveillance Systems (SOSUS), ref. figure 1, the system(s) can also be applied in the strategic detection of hostile ballistic missile submarines and hunter-killer (attack) submarines.All references, terms, definitions, and phrases related to all aspects mentioned in the appendices, "Introduction", "Prior art", “Invention” sections and in the figures, also apply to, form the basis of, and are incorporated into the invention represented by this document.Some general elements like comments covering e. g. definitions, real time control systems, AI, etc. follow what is stated in our previous documents NO20220294 and NO20230704 (“self-reference”).Ship, vessel, vehicle, device, object, target, diver, activity, submarine are synonymous terms. Any surface or underwater object can be manned, unmanned, remotely operated or autonomous.The term "offshore" represents any device, structure or installation located on, within or at the bottom (subsea) of water. Equivalently, "onshore" represents any device or structure located not on, within or under water (subsea).The term “installation”, “platform”, “structure”, “units”, “source” are synonymous concepts. The statement “at least one of” means, from a set of variables, activities or processes (synonymous terms) [a1, a2, …an] either a1, a2, …or an isolated (single activity) or any combination(s) among the variables. The term “at least one of” and “any combinations of” are synonymous.Cable, (power) line, connection and wire are synonymous terms.“Crude oil”, “petroleum components”, “refined products”, “non-refined petroleum” and “oil” are synonymous terms. The term "gas" represents any combination of the gasses methane, ethane, propane, butane and the terms Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) and condensate. The concept "natural gas" is a mixture of methane and varying amounts of other higher alkanes. Condensate is NGL (Natural Gas Liquids) and hexane, heptane and octane. NGL is LPG (Liquid Petroleum Gas) and ethane and pentane. LPG is a mix of propane and butane. Natural gas can contain CO2, N2 and sulfide in addition to "gas". "Gas" and "natural gas" are synonymous terms.Hydrocarbons (HC) can be any combination of gas and (crude) oil.“Grid” and “network” are synonymous terms.“Source” and “supply” are synonymous terms.“Power source” and energy source” are synonymous terms.Prior ArtWO2009/114063 describes an underwater surveillance system, which may be used in the counterterrorism for detecting swimming intruders. In one embodiment, the system includes a sonar array of multiple sensor elements that both transmit and receive acoustic signals.EP2017/083828 represents an acoustic detection system provided for detecting targets at least partially immersed in a defined area. The detection system comprising at least one multi-static detection group, each multi-static detection group defining a detection zone , and comprising: a submerged transmitter emitting at low frequencies; A plurality of immersed receivers comprising at least two receivers, each receiver of a given group forming with the transmitter of the group a bi-static pair, each bi-static pair generating an elementary detection zone surrounding a zone of shadow.US6366533 outlines a reconnaissance/surveillance system for remote viewing of a selected location while providing a standoff distance from the selected location for personnel controlling the reconnaissance/surveillance system, comprising:an underwater delivery vehicle including, e. g. a propulsion system, a telescoping mast, a global positioning system, a camera, a laser target, a communications link connected between the operator control console and the remote-controlled underwater vehicles. InventionThe objective technical problem to be solved by the invention, is to develop add-on, passive underwater surveillance, and detection systems and applications, operated on and controlled through, with communications to or from a central processing unit, via civic or commercial offshore power cables to at least one underwater sensor. Such cables can, but are not limited to, AC/DC transmission lines between countries or regions, e. g. power cables between Norway and the UK, represent power lines from offshore wind (and/or solar, tidal, current) power generating units or farms, or power connections to or from offshore installations. These installations can be on the surface, be submerged, semi-submerged or located on the seabed. The systems can also be applied to guard hydrocarbon carrying pipelines. The latter application needs a separate wire to provide electric power and for communications to and from the various sensors, and other components constituting the protection or warning systems.The systems can be private or governmentally owned and/or operated.More than one independent system can be integrated and/or controlled, e. g. related to the strategic surveillance of (hostile) submarines.Major Components Constituting the InventionFor a description of theory related to power transmissions by offshore cables, see Appendix.Real-time ControlReal-time control requires controllers to capture all the significant target activities and to deliver their responses as swiftly as possible so that system performance is never degraded. In Advanced Industrial Control Technology, Peng Zhang, 2010, ISBN: 978-1-4377-7807-6, https://www.sciencedirect.com/book/9781437778076/advanced-industrial-controltechnology#book-info, structure and requirements to real-time control systems are outlined, excerpts (chapter 1.2.1, line 7):“A control operation is a series of events or actions occurring within system hardware and software to give a specific result. A real-time control system is a system in which the correctness of a result depends not only on its logical correctness but also on the time interval in which the result is made available. The following three standards give the definition of a real-time control operation, and an industrial control system in which all thecontrol operations occur in real-time qualifies as a real-time control system: (1) Reliable operation execution - the operation execution must be stable, and it must be repeatable.(2) Determined operation deadline - any control operation needs time to execute.(3) Predictable operation result -the result for any control operation must be predictable.”Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies will advance or support the next generation of control systems.Based on e.g. combinations of, but not limited to, Model Predictive Control, (MPC), Proportional Integral Derivative (PID), Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL), three characteristics of AI-based controllers can be emphasized;1. Learning: DRL-based controllers learn by methodically and continuously practicing (machine learning).2. Delayed gratification: DRL-based controllers can learn to recognize sub-optimal behavior in the short term, which enables the optimization of gains in the long term.3. Non-traditional input data: DRL-based controllers manage the intake and are able evaluate sensor information that automated systems cannot.The enablement of e.g. DRL-based control systems to a process facility, require, but are not limited to, the following steps in delivering a DRL-based controls:1. Preparation of a companion simulation model for the (AI) brain,2. Design and training of the (AI) brain,3. Assessment of the trained (AI) brain,4. Deployment.For further reading, see e.g. :https://www.controleng.com/articles/evolution-of-controlsystems-with-artificial-intelligence/In this context the AI brain(s) is/are, but not limited to, to be trained to, at least one of; foresee, forecast, predict, simulate or otherwise, related to underwater activities related to;- underwater and surface activities related to ships, manned, unmanned devices, remotely operated or autonomous vehicles, submarines, marine mammals, - filter out (background) noise,- sudden or unexpected changes in power demand from the power cable, platform(s) or offshore field(s) as part of the grid,supply and/or delivery status to any connected grid or electric power system connected;- by the at least one sea cable,- wind status,- weather status,- technical and maintenance status to the various components constituting the surveillance system.Advanced power-grid monitoring systems combine i.a. load-balancing, power-supply monitoring, metering functions, protection, supervision of power quality and disturbances, transient monitoring, and to enable efficient power delivery. For details, see e.g.: https://www.mouser.com/pdfdocs/Solar-Maxim-Power_Grid_Monitoring.pdf https://www.dnv.com/services/grid-code-compliance-measurements-72067https://www.dnv.com/services/grid-code-compliance-measurements-72067 https://www.vaisala.com/en/lp/leveraging-lidar-offshore-wind-energy? https://unipower.se/products-and-services/power-quality-management-system/pq-secure/Acoustic Detection of Underwater ObjectsTraditional means of detecting submerged objects are the use of passive and active sonars or hydrophones. As general concepts sonars and hydrophones are in this context defined as synonymous terms.However, hydrophone is a passive sonar, representing a specialized transducer or an underwater microphone, with no active acoustic or otherwise emissions. Its sole purpose is to listen to sounds in the ocean. Active sonar sends out a (acoustic) pulses of energy that travels through water, reflects off of an object, and returns to a receiver. A hydrophone is an unavoidable component of all passive sonar devices, allowing the latter to listen, receive the echo or noise from any underwater object and locate it.Also, the ocean can be a noisy environment, influenced by seafloor features, water depth, thermocline layers, with sounds from natural sources like marine animals, breaking waves, rain, lightning, earthquakes, and man-made sources like ships, offshore wind farms, pipeline activities, seismic exploration, and the like.For further analyses, see e. g.: Domingos, L. C. F. et al A Survey of Underwater Acoustic Data Classification Methods Using Deep Learning for Shoreline Surveillance, Sensors, 22(6), 2181; https://doi.org/10.3390/s22062181, 2022.https://www.usff.navy.mil/Community-Outreach/US-Navy-Stewards-of-the-Sea/Science-of-Sound/hydrophoneshttps://www.colmaritalia.it/project/underwater-hydrophones-for-military-applications/Acoustic Stealth TechnologiesSubmarines have played a continuous hide and seek game with anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Modern multi-layer stealth hull designs, stealth contours, reactive tiles/outer surface, acoustic absorptive tiles/surface coatings etc, are all elements making modern underwater devices and submarines virtually silent or undetectable to traditional hydrophones and active sonars.For elaborations, see e. g.;https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/11/first-submarine-to-use-new-stealthtechnology/#prettyPhoto/0/https://www.newscientist.com/article/2340542-stealth-rubber-coating-could-makesubmarines-nearly-invisible-to-sonar/https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-develops-new-stealth-technology-for-its-submarines/Magnetic Anomaly Detection – MADMAD systems consist of, but are not limited to, highly sensitive magnetometers, (electromagnetic) gradiometers which are designed to detect changes in the earth's natural magnetic field due to metallic objects in the vicinity. MAD systems can be stationary, mounted on, but not limited to, mobile devices, underwater vehicles, submarines, ships, aircraft. On aircraft, the MAD system is most likely mounted in the tail area to minimize magnetic interference.MAD signals can suffer from magnetic noise interference from geology, geomagnetic, ocean motion, platform vibrations and motions.For examples of MAD sensors, see e. g.: https://product.tdk.comhttps://www.senis.swiss/magnetometers/teslameter-digital/3mh6-e-high-precision-teslameterwith-interchangeable-hall-probes/https://www.bartington.com/applications/magnetic-anomaly-detection/The structure and machinery used in ships and submarines are made of ferromagnetic materials, which generate magnetic anomalies. A degaussing system can significantly reduce the magnetic signature. Ship degaussing involves e. g. surrounding the structure in all three dimensions with copper coils which have a bidirectional DC flowing through them. This generates an opposite magnetic field to that created by ships or submarines.For further analyses regarding degaussing, see e. g.: https://www.hensoldt.net/products/spectrum-dominance/gewr-grx-monitoring-receivers/mask/ Sarvito, S. et al. Study of Degaussing System for Reducing Magnetic Field From Submersible Vehicle. International Journal of Marine Engineering Innovation and Research 1(2), DOI:10.12962/j25481479.v1i2.1979, 2017. https://www.ecagroup.com/en/solutions/degaussing-systemsWPT-PLC SystemsPLC or programmable logic controller is a type of processing unit that can receive data through its inputs and send operating instructions through its outputs. The major functioning of a PLC is to control a system’s functions using the internal logic programmed into it.Wireless power transfer (WPT) and/or wireless power transmission,represents electromagnetic power transfer or the transmission of electricalenergy without wires as a physical link. Wireless power transfer is useful to power electrical devices where interconnecting wires are inconvenient or are not possible.WPT-PLC systems can be mounted on or to power lines or placed in the vicinity of such AC/DC power lines (near field or rear field connected).Integrated wireless power transfer and power line communication can be integrated into WPT-PLC systems. For details see e. g.:Barmada, S. et al. Full simulation of a wireless power transfer system with power line communication integration, ACES Conference, Williamsburg, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283556387_Full_simulation_of_a_wireless_power_ transfer_system_with_power_line_communication_integration#pf2, 2015.Sarraj, A. et al. Harmonic distortion considerations for an integrated WPT-PLC system.Wireless Power Transfer , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , https://doi.org/10.1017/wpt.2020.4, March 2020.https://www.amazon.com/Advanced-PLC-Hardware-Programming-Allen-Bradley/dp/0578482231Fiber Optic HydrophonesFiber optic hydrophones use optical fibers to detect changes in pressure.Fiber-optic hydrophone (FOH) is a new generation of acoustic sensors, which can be used in both military and civilian fields such as underwater target detection, oil and natural gas prospecting, or earthquake inspection. Precent progress of FOH includes, but not limited to, large-scale FOH array, very low frequency (VLF), extremely low frequency (ELF) detection, fiber-optic vector hydrophone (FOVH), towed linear array, and deep-sea and long-haul transmission. Arrays of FOH are integral components of modern submarines. In 2003, the first lightweight wide aperture array (LWWAA) consisting of 2700 sensors, went into service with the launching of USS Virginia.For elaborations see e. g.:Meng, Z. et al. Recent Progress in Fiber-Optic Hydrophones. PHOTONIC SENSORS / Vol.11, No.1, 2021: 109‒122.https://optics11.com/defense/https://optics11.com/pressrelease/innovative-dutch-hydrophones-protect-submarine-cablesfrom-sabotage-threats/https://oceansonics.com/blog/the-challenges-facing-sensor-design-for-deep-sea-deploymenteco-magazine-dec-2020/The Detection and Analysis of Extremely and Very Low FrequenciesAS discussed, the primary means of underwater detection have been acoustic methods.Recently, non-acoustic detection techniques have been applied for this purpose.In this analysis extremely low frequency (ELF) fields are represented by electromagnetic fields with frequencies below 300 Hz. Very low frequencies are frequencies (VLF) below 1 kHz. The main source of ELF is AC. In Europe this is mainly 50Hz. However, any appliances or electric device emits ELF. ELF fields have an electric and a magnetic component. - An electric field (EF) is the force created by the attraction and repulsion of electric charges (the cause of electric flow), and is measured in volts per meter (V/m). - A magnetic field (MF) is a force created as a consequence of the movement of the charges (flow of electricity) or current. The strength of the magnetic field is measured in units per amperes per meter (A/m). However, the magnetic field is usually expressed as magnetic flux density, measured in Tesla (T) or micro tesla (mT).Another common unit to measure the magnetic field is gauss (G), where 1 G = 10-4 T. The primary difference between EF and acoustic (sound) field in the sea, is that the EF has no noise similar to reverberation. EF is mainly affected by the induced EF generated by sea wave, tide, ocean current and other seawater movements. These noise levels are in the magnitude of μV. For discussions related to ocean noise, see e. g.:Utada H. Electromagnetic exploration of the oceanic mantle. Proc Jpn Acad Ser B Phys Biol Sci ;91(6):203e22, 2015.Viacheslav, Spichak V. Advances in electromagnetic techniques for exploration, prospecting, and monitoring of hydrocarbon deposits. First Break;36(10):75e81, 2018.Guoqiang X, Weiying C, Shu Y. Research study on short time-domain electromagnetic method for deep exploration. J Appl Geophys; 15(5), 2015.Galvanic currents flowing in the water around a surface or submerged object (hull) will generate an underwater electric field. This field is responsible for ELF EM emissions. The rotation of the shaft(s) will modulate another galvanic current passing through the shaftbearing-hull, thus causing ELF EM signals into the water.The corrosion related shaft-rate electromagnetic (EM) field source of underwater moving targets is also of great interest. It produces extremely low ELF emissions.In order to reduce the probability of detection, stealth techniques like active shaft grounding systems and advanced impressed current cathodic protection systems, have been applied as counter measures.A stationary or resting submarine on the seabed is even more difficult to detect.A solution to this challenge can be to arrange several passive phase-sensitive EM gradiometers in a cascade arrangement, mimicking a moving observer, using deviations in the Natural Electromagnetic Background (NEB) fields. NEB fields are caused by the natural pulsations of the Earth’s MF and EF. A central objective of this invention is to locate and estimate the trajectory or movements of any object by detecting and measuring the ELF radiated by the target itself, under noisy conditions, in real time. This includes stationary or moving targets, both in shallow and deepsea waters.One such approach or algorithm is the use of a Progressive (Bayes) Updated Extended Kalman Filter (PUEKF) model. Traditional Kalman filters utilize a one-step observation update. The concept of progressive Bayes is to insert pseudo time series, and gradually introduce observation information to solve the problem of a too narrow Extended Kalman Function. PUEKF is a new nonlinear filtering algorithm based on the progressive updating idea of progressive Bayes and extended Kalman filters. For further details, see e. g.:Zhang, J-W, et al. Real-time localization for underwater equipment using an extremely low frequency electric field. Defense Technology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dt.2022.06.014 , 2022.Zhou, S. et al. Progressive Kalman Filter and Its Application in Magnetic Target Tracking. 2019 4th International Conference on Mechanical, Control and Computer Engineering (ICMCCE), DOI: 10.1109/ICMCCE48743.2019.00086, 2019.Hanebech, U. D. et al. Progressive Bayes: A New Framework for Nonlinear State Estimation. Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, DOI:10.1117/12.487806, April 2003.Birsan, M. Measurement of the extremely low frequency (ELF) magnetic field emission from a ship. Measurement Science and Technology, Volume 22, Number 8, 2011.A different modeling technique is proposed by Wang et al. where the ELF radiation source(s) can be evaluated based on a three-layer model, based on media consisting of air (region 1: z ≥ 0), seawater with depth of D (region 2: −D ≤ z < 0) and seafloor (region 3: z < −D).Numerical calculations of the three fields can be performed by the use of numerical integration techniques by solving Sommerfeld integrals. See e. g. for details;Wang, J. et al. A Novel Detection Method for Underwater Moving Targets by Measuring Their ELF Emissions with Inductive Sensors. Sensors (Basel). Aug; 17(8): 1734, 2017.Bubenik, D.M. A practical method for the numerical evaluation of Sommerfeld integrals. IEEE Trans. Antennas Propag.25, 904–906.18. 1977.For review of ELF sensors, besides fiber optic hydrophones, inductive and otherwise, see e. g.:https://www.ibspe.com/measuring-systems/inductive-measuring-systems/ https://realpars.com/inductive-sensor/https://www.tekscan.com/store/category/force-measurement-systems-elf https://www.dytran.com/Model-7706A-Extended-Low-Frequency-ELF-Accelerometer/Shielding of a CableIt can be advantageous to mask a submerged cable from e. g. an offshore wind farm to the onshore stations. This can also be relevant for a wire supporting a detection system guarding a HC pipeline. This is to prohibit detection and to avoid possible sabotage. A perfectly conducting enclosure is called a Faraday cage. Key concepts for practical electric field shielding are choosing a location that will intercept the stronger field lines, and the choosing of a suitably conductive shield material.Because there are no free magnetic charges, it is not possible to terminate lines of magnetic flux on a shield. However, it is possible to redirect magnetic flux lines to prevent unwanted couplings. A coax AC cable can add extra EM shielding, but ELF emittance is not avoidable. Combinations of burial into the seabed, adequate shielding and the redirection of magnetic flux lines, can provide some camouflage of the detection systems and supporting power and communications cables.For elaborations, see e. g.:https://learnemc.com/practical-em-shieldingThomas, S. et. Al. (ed.) Porous Nanocomposites for Electromagnetic Interference Shielding, Elsevier, ISBN: 9780323900355, 2023.Celozzi, S. et al. Electromagnetic Shielding, Theory and Applications, John Wiley and Sons Ltd., ISBN 9781119736288, 2022.Detailed Description of the InventionSystems for underwater surveillance have been developed. In the case of at least one HVDC/AC cable between countries (4), or at least one cable to and from offshore wind farms or offshore HC installations (4), the control system (not shown), integrated with the at least one Central Processing Unit (7), controls and communicates ciphered with the at least one sensor (1), through the at least one processing unit (2) and the at least one Wireless Power Transfer – Programmable Logic Controller WPT-PLC unit (3). The at least one sensor (1), processing unit (2), is powered and gets commands through the at least one WPT-PLC unit (3). The at least one unit (1), (2) and (3), obtains their power by electromagnetic power transfer from the at least one cable (4). The at least one power line (4) can be connected to an at least one onshore grid (5) and/or an at least one offshore grid (6).A wire (4) can power and communicate, ciphered, directly with an at least one sensor (1), via a processing unit (2). In this case, the unit (3) can be, but not necessarily, be directly or physically connected to the wire (4). In this case the at least one unit (3) will be a PLC unit. The at least one unit (3) (WPT-PLC unit or a PLC unit) and the at least one processing unit (2) can be integrated into one unit. In the latter case the WPT-PLC or PLC functions (3) are executed by or within the at least one processing unit (2).With reference to fig.2, the at least one sensor (1), constituting a (passive) hydrophone represented by, but not limited to, among a fiberoptic hydrophone (FOH), inductive or not, FOH array, aperture array (LWWAA), a magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) system represented by, but not limited to, magnetometers, gradiometers, a processing unit (2), which can, but is not limited to, guide the power to the at least one sensor (1), cipher (encrypt), decipher (decrypt) or code signals to and from the at least one sensor (1).The at least one sensor (1) can detect signals above 20 kHz, below 20 kHz, below 1 kHz or below 100 Hz. Signal detection in the range 0 < f < 100 Hz is emphasized.At least one WPT-PLC unit (3), is located on, near or in the vicinity of the at least one power line (4). The at least one power line can be a HVDC/AC power cable (4). Such cables can, but are not limited to, HVAC/HVDC transmission lines between countries or regions, represent power lines from offshore wind (and/or solar, tidal, current) power generating units or farms, or power connections to or from offshore installations, both from land grids or other offshore grids.In the case of a protection system guarding the at least one HC pipeline, the at least one wire can carry non-HVDC/AC, e. g. V < 1 kV, and the WPT-PLC system or unit can be an integral part of or directly connected to, and representing a simple PLC unit, of the at least one power and communication wire (4).A cable (4) can be buried, shielded or magnetically rerouted to mask its existence.(5) represents at least one onshore grid. Likewise, (6) represents at least one offshore grid. A cable (4) can be connected to (5) or (6), or both (5) and (6). In case (4) represents at least one wire guarding a HC pipeline, (5) and/or (6) can be omitted and (4) is connected directly to the at least one Central Processing Unit (CPU) (7). The at least one CPU (7), is/are represented by the at least one real time control system (not shown), enabling, but not limited to;- cipher or decipher (encrypt or decrypt) signals to or from the at least one sensor (1), - control the power to the at least one sensor (1), the at least one WPT-PLC unit (3),- store and/or analyze signals from the at least one sensor (1),- operate and respond to input/output from or to the at least one AI Brain (not shown), Provide warnings to at least one operator electronically and/or by audio or by any other means of communication if an activity is detected and defined as not from a natural source or represents noise.An operator can be a human being, but not necessarily.A most preferable system or systems constitute a surveillance system for offshore infrastructure, comprising:at least one sensor;a central processing unit;a wireless power transfer unit programmable logic controller (WPT-PLC) or a programmable logic controller unit (PLC); anda local processing unit,wherein the central processing unit communicates with the at least one sensor through the local processing unit and the programmable logic controller,the local processing unit decodes and codes signals to and from the at least one sensor; the programmable logic controller is powered wirelessly or by wire by an electric cable or wire of the offshore infrastructure, provides electric power to the at least one sensor and the local processing unit, and communicates the signals to and from the central processing unit. The surveillance system, wherein the at least one sensor includes a plurality of sensors, the local processing unit and the programmable logic controller communicating with each of the plurality of sensors.The surveillance system wherein the at least one sensor is a hydrophone. The surveillance system, wherein the hydrophone is one of a fiberoptic hydrophone (FOH), an FOH array, a lightweight wide aperture array (LWWAA), and a magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) system.The surveillance system, wherein the central processing unit encodes and decodes the signals to and from the at least one sensor, controls power to the at least one sensor via the WPT-PLC or PLC, and stores and analyzes signals from the at least one sensor.The surveillance system wherein the central processing unit provides alerts to an operator when a non-natural source of noise is detected.The surveillance system wherein the offshore infrastructure is an offshore power cable connected to at least one of an onshore grid and an offshore grid, and the WPT-PLC or PLC is configured to obtain power wirelessly from the offshore power cable and to communicate with the central processing unit through the offshore power cable.The surveillance system, wherein the offshore infrastructure is a pipeline, and the system further comprises a wire running along the pipeline to provide power and communications, wherein the WPT-PLC or PLC obtains power from the wire and communicates with the central processing unit through the wire. Appendix Theory related to Power Transmission by Submarine CablesSea cables exceeding approximately 140 km in distance (from shore), would need high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission systems based on voltage source converter technology (VSC), see e. g. https://www.entsoe.eu/Technopedia/techsheets/voltage-sourceconverters. However, VSC systems are costly due to a need for offshore converter units. An alternative to offshore DC solutions, are low frequency alternating current (LFAC) systems. A (common) frequency of choice would be 162/3 Hz.Basics related to HVDC:Ohm’s law:Qc = VIc and V = RIcQc = RIc2 = V2/R (1)WhereQc = power transmitted by cableIc = currentR = resistanceV = voltageBasics related to HVAC:Ic = 2 πfCl(Vn/√3) (2)Wheref = system frequencyC = capacitance per unit lengthl = total length of the cableVn = nominal phase to phase voltageQc = 3Ic(Vn/√3) = 2 πfCl(Vn)2 (3)Transformer For a power transformer, the electro-magnetic force (EMF) induced in coils E = 4.4fNtAcB (4)Nt = number of turns in windingsAc = cross sectional area of the coreB = magnetic flux densityInductance, LL = ( μ/2 π) ln(De/GMR) (5)μ = permeability of the conductor (wire element)GMR = geometric mean of radius of the conductorDe = penetration depth into the ground (seabed)De = 659 √( ρearth/f)Capacitance, C, for a coax cableC = 2 π ε/ln(r2/r1) (6)ε = permittivity of the insulation, r1, the conductor radius, r2 is the radius over the insulation and semi-conducting layer.Conductance, GG = 2 π τ/[ln(r2/r1)] (7)τ = conductivity of the insulation between the conductor and the outer insulation.For elaborations, se e. g.:Duncan Glover J., Overbye T. J., Sarma, M. S. Power System Analysis & Design, 6th Edition, Cengage Learning, 20 Channel Center Street Boston, MA 02210 USA, 2017. Padmanaban, S., Sharmeela, C., Holm-Nielsen, J. B., Sivaraman, P. (editors) Power Quality in Modern Power Systems, 1st Edition - November 20, 2020, ISBN: 9780128233467, Associated Press, 1st Edition - November 20, 2020.
Claims
Claims1. A surveillance system for offshore infrastructure, comprising:at least one sensor (1);a central processing unit (7);characterized in that the system comprises:a wireless power transfer unit programmable logic controller WPT-PLC (3) or a programmable logic controller unit PLC (3); anda local processing unit (2),wherein the central processing unit (7) communicates with the at least one sensor (1) through the local processing unit (2) and the programmable logic controller (3),the local processing unit (2) decodes and codes signals to and from the at least one sensor (1);the programmable logic controller (3) is powered wirelessly or by wire (4) by an electric cable or wire of the offshore infrastructure, provides electric power to the at least one sensor (1) and the local processing unit (2), and communicates the signals to and from the central processing unit (7).2. The surveillance system of claim 1, wherein the at least one sensor (1) includes a plurality of sensors, the local processing unit (2) and the programmable logic controller (3) communicating with each of the plurality of sensors.3. The surveillance system of claim 1, wherein the at least one sensor (1) is a hydrophone.4. The surveillance system of claim 3, wherein the hydrophone is one of a fiberoptic hydrophone (FOH), an FOH array, a lightweight wide aperture array (LWWAA), and a magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) system.5. The surveillance system of claim 1, wherein the central processing unit (7) encodes and decodes the signals to and from the at least one sensor (1), controls power to the at least one sensor (1) via the WPT-PLC or PLC (3), and stores and analyzes signals from the at least one sensor (1).6. The surveillance system of claim 1, wherein the central processing unit (7) provides alerts to an operator when a non-natural source of noise is detected.7. The surveillance system of claim 1, wherein the offshore infrastructure is an offshore power cable connected to at least one of an onshore grid (5) and an offshore grid (6), and the WPT-PLC (3) or PLC (3) is configured to obtain power wirelessly from the offshore power cable and to communicate with the central processing unit (7) through the offshore power cable.8. The surveillance system of claim 1, wherein the offshore infrastructure is a pipeline, and the system further comprises a wire (4) running along the pipeline to provide power and communications, wherein the WPT-PLC or PLC (3) obtains power from the wire (4) and communicates with the central processing unit (7) through the wire (4).9. The surveillance system according to any one of the previous claims, characterized bythe at least one WPT-PLC or PLC unit (3) and the at least one processing unit (2) can be integrated into at least one unit.10. The surveillance system according to any one of the previous claims, characterized bythe system (1-7) being integrated and/or controlled.Krav1. Et overvåkningssystem for offshore-infrastruktur, omfattende:minst én sensor (1);en sentral prosesseringsenhet (7);kjennetegnet av at systemet omfatter:en trådløs strømoverføringsenhet programmerbar logisk kontroller WPT-PLC (3) eller en programmerbar logisk kontrollerenhet PLC (3); ogen lokal prosesseringsenhet (2), der den sentrale prosesseringsenheten (7) kommuniserer med minst én sensor (1) gjennom den lokale prosesseringsenheten (2) og den programmerbare logiske kontrolleren (3), den lokale prosesseringsenheten (2) dekoder og koder signaler til og fra minst én sensor (1);den programmerbare logiske kontrolleren (3) får kraft trådløst eller via ledning (4) av en elektrisk kabel eller ledning forbundet ved offshore-infrastrukturen, gir elektrisk strøm til minst én sensor (1) og den lokale prosesseringsenheten (2), og kommuniserer signalene til og fra den sentrale prosesseringsenheten (7).2. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge krav 1, der minst én sensor (1) inkluderer flere sensorer, kommuniserer den lokale prosesseringsenheten (2) og den programmerbare logiske kontrolleren (3) med hver av de flere sensorene.3. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge krav 1, der minst én sensor (1) er en hydrofon.4. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge krav 3, der hydrofonen er en av en fiberoptisk hydrofon (FOH), en FOH-matrise, en lettvekts bred aperturmatrise (LWWAA) og et magnetisk anomalideteksjonssystem (MAD).5. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge krav 1, der den sentrale prosesseringsenheten (7) koder og dekoder signalene til og fra minst én sensor (1), kontrollerer strøm til minst én sensor (1) via WPT-PLC eller PLC (3), og lagrer og analyserer signaler fra minst én sensor (1).6. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge krav 1, der den sentrale prosesseringsenheten (7) gir alarmer til en operatør når en ikke-naturlig støykilde oppdages.7. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge krav 1, der offshore-infrastrukturen er en offshore strømkabel tilkoblet minst én av et landbasert rutenett (5) og et offshore-rutenett (6), og WPT-PLC (3) eller PLC (3) er konfigurert for å få strøm trådløst fra den offshorestrømkabelen og kommunisere med den sentrale prosesseringsenheten (7) gjennom den offshore strømkabelen.8. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge krav 1, der offshore-infrastrukturen er en rørledning, og systemet omfatter ytterligere en ledning (4) som løper langs rørledningen for å gi strøm og kommunikasjon, der WPT-PLC eller PLC (3) får strøm fra ledningen (4) og kommuniserer med den sentrale prosesseringsenheten (7) gjennom ledningen (4).9. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge et hvilket som helst av de foregående kravene, kjennetegnet av at minst én WPT-PLC- eller PLC-enhet (3) og minst én prosesseringsenhet (2) kan integreres i minst én enhet.10. Overvåkningssystemet ifølge et hvilket som helst av de foregående kravene, kjennetegnet av at systemet (1-7) er integrert og/eller styrt.
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IPC classesH04B 3/54G01S 3/80G01S 15/00G01S 15/04H04B 11/00G10K 11/00CPC classesH04B 3/54G01S 3/80G01S 15/00G01S 15/04H04B 11/00G10K 11/00

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US 2023102846 A1 (A1)EP 4190694 A1 (A1)NO 20110339 A1 (A1)

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MODI VIVENDI AS
MODI VIVENDI AS

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Putten 50 1676 KRÅKERØY NO (FREDRIKSTAD Municipality, Østfold county)Org. number: 988979139Inventors
Gunnar Myhr
Putten 50 1676 KRÅKERØY NO (FREDRIKSTAD Municipality, Østfold county)

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InnsigelseReceived: 26.02.2025 NIPO's case No.: 2025/00077Current status: Avgjort. Innsigelsen er forkastet
OpponentEQUINOR ENERGY AS Forusbeen 50 4035 STAVANGER NO
Opponent's agentACAPO ONSAGERS AS Edvard Griegs vei 1 5059 BERGEN NO (BERGEN Municipality, Vestland county)
Org. number: 932214636Reference: OP1262NO00

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